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Using vector autoregressions on U.S. time series for 1957-1979 and 1983-2004, we ￿nd government
spending shocks to have stronger e⁄ects on output, consumption, and wages in the earlier sample.
We try to account for this observation within a DSGE model featuring price rigidities and limited
asset market participation. Speci￿cally, we estimate the structural parameters of the model for
both samples by matching impulse responses. Model-based counterfactual experiments suggest that
increased asset market participation accounts for some of the changes in ￿scal transmission. However,
the key quantitative factor appears to be the more active monetary policy of the Volcker-Greenspan
period.
JEL classi￿cations: E21, E62, E63
Keywords: Government Spending, Asset Market Participation, Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy,
DSGE, Vector Autoregression, Minimum Distance Estimation
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January 2006Non-technical Summary
One of the most prominent issues in macroeconomics concerns the e⁄ects of an increase in government
spending. In recent empirical research on postwar U.S. data, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) provided
evidence that consumption and output respond positively to an exogenous ￿scal shock. More detailed
analysis, however, appears to reveal changes in the transmission of U.S. ￿scal policy shocks around the
early 1980s. Speci￿cally, both Perotti (2005) and Mihov (2003) report fresh VAR-based evidence showing
a substantial reduction in the expansionary e⁄ects of spending shocks after 1980.
What accounts for the changes in ￿scal policy transmission over time? The fact that the above-
mentioned studies point to a break date around 1980 suggests several interesting hypotheses. First, it is
widely accepted that the conduct of monetary policy di⁄ered substantially before and after the 1980s.
This change may, of course, have a⁄ected the transmission of shocks in the economy quite generally.
A second hypothesis draws on the observation that ￿scal policy itself has changed. Perotti (2005), for
example, notes that a typical shock to government spending displays much less persistence in the later
sample. A third explanation stresses the economics of private consumption behavior by pointing out
the possible consequences arising from an increase in asset market participation. Indeed, retail ￿nancial
markets were subject to signi￿cant restrictions until the late 1970s. These restrictions may have e⁄ectively
prevented a large fraction of households from smoothing consumption in the desired way, giving rise to
"Keynesian" consumption behavior. To the extent that this explains the strong crowding-in e⁄ects of
government spending documented for the 1960s and 1970s, one may conjecture that the change in ￿scal
transmission around 1980 is critically related to the process of ￿nancial liberalization enacted at the same
time. Thus, increasing asset market participation competes with changes in monetary and ￿scal policies
as candidate explanations for the observed decline in the e⁄ects of U.S. government spending.
The goal of the present paper is to evaluate the relative importance of these di⁄erent causes. A better
understanding of how and why ￿scal transmission changed during the early 1980s seems valuable in its
own right but also with respect to the more general changes in business cycle behavior that have come
to be called the "Great Moderation". Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000)
were the ￿rst to highlight a marked decrease in the volatility of economic activity since the mid-1980s.
Several subsequent papers, including Stock and Watson (2003) and Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004),
have attempted to explain the sources of this phenomenon, examining some of the same aspects that we
focus on, notably changes in macroeconomic policies and the behavior of the private sector.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. We begin by adding to the empirical evidence on ￿scal trans-
mission provided by Perotti (2005) and Mihov (2003). Speci￿cally, we estimate structural VARs on U.S.
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January 2006time series for 1957:1-1979:2 (￿ S1￿ ) and 1983:1-2004:4 (￿ S2￿ ) and document the aforementioned reduction
in the strength and persistence of ￿scal policy e⁄ects on output, wages and private consumption. S1 and
S2 constitute appropriate samples for our study, because they allow us to characterize ￿scal policies before
and after any of the potentially important changes to monetary policy, government spending, ￿nancial
markets, and the business cycle in general.
In the second step, we introduce a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model featuring
price rigidities, monetary and ￿scal policies, as well as limited asset market participation. Thus, the
model nests all three possible explanations for di⁄erences in ￿scal transmission across samples. Given
that economic interest is centered on the impulse responses associated with a government spending
shock, we consider this statistic as the critical nexus between theory and data. Accordingly, we rely
on a minimum distance strategy that matches impulse responses from the theoretical model with those
obtained from the VARs. This procedure provides us with estimates for the parameters of our model for
both samples and thereby allows us to judge the quantitative importance of changes in both household
behavior and government policies. Estimating our model for both samples, we allow policy parameters
and the extent of asset market participation to vary, while all deep parameters (pertaining to preferences
and technology) are assumed to remain unchanged. The parameter estimates we obtain con￿rm that
asset market participation has increased considerably after 1980. Our results on monetary policy align
with the consensus view that the Fed has taken a tougher stand on in￿ ation after 1980. In addition, the
estimates characterizing ￿scal policy are also quite di⁄erent across samples, implying that government
spending shocks have become less persistent and more de￿cit-￿nanced in S2.
In a third step, we run counterfactual experiments to assess the individual impact of these changes
on the transmission of ￿scal shocks. Keeping all deep parameters constant, we investigate which of the
changes between the two samples may have been pivotal for the change in ￿scal transmission. We ￿nd that
increased asset market participation accounts for some of the changes in the propagation of government
spending shocks, notably the reduced persistence of e⁄ects in S2. However, the key quantitative factor
driving the changes appears to be monetary policy. Lastly, the change in the degree of de￿cit ￿nancing
is crucial to account for the strikingly di⁄erent responses of government debt across the two samples.
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One of the most prominent issues in macroeconomics concerns the e⁄ects of an increase in government
spending. The topic takes center stage in the policy debate and has received great attention in the
theoretical literature at least since Keynes￿General Theory. Recently, empirical research dealing with
this question has ￿ ourished, as well. In a seminal study based on vector autoregressions (VAR) for a
long postwar sample, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) provided evidence indicating a positive response of
consumption and output to a one-time ￿scal shock. Speci￿cally, the authors analyzed U.S. time series
data from 1960 to 1997 and reported a spending multiplier for consumption between one third and one.
Similar ￿ndings were obtained by FatÆs and Mihov (2001) and Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2005).
More recent empirical studies, however, suggest that the transmission of ￿scal policy shocks actually
changed around the early 1980s. Indeed, both Perotti (2005) and Mihov (2003) provide fresh VAR-based
evidence showing a substantial reduction in the expansionary e⁄ects of spending shocks after 1980.
What accounts for the changes in the transmission of U.S. ￿scal policy over time? The fact that the
aforementioned studies point to a break around 1980 suggests several interesting hypotheses. First, it is
widely accepted that the conduct of monetary policy di⁄ered substantially before and after the 1980s.
This change may, of course, have a⁄ected the transmission of shocks in the economy quite generally.
A second hypothesis draws on the observation that ￿scal policy itself has changed. Perotti (2005), for
example, reports that a typical shock to government spending displays much less persistence in the later
sample. A third explanation stresses the economics of private consumption behavior by pointing out
the possible consequences arising from an increase in asset market participation. Indeed, retail ￿nancial
markets were subject to signi￿cant restrictions until the late 1970s. Bilbiie and Straub (2004a) argue
that these restrictions may have e⁄ectively prevented a large fraction of households from smoothing their
consumption in the desired way. Lacking access to asset markets, such households would tend to exhibit
an extreme version of "Keynesian" consumption behavior, where current consumption perfectly tracks
current income, as has been suggested in recent papers by Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2005) and Bilbiie
and Straub (2004b). To the extent that this explains the strong crowding-in e⁄ects of government spend-
ing documented for the 1960s and 1970s, one may conjecture that the change in ￿scal transmission around
1980 is critically related to the process of ￿nancial liberalization enacted at the same time.1 Speci￿cally,
deregulation and ￿nancial innovation may have widened private access to asset markets, reducing the
number of households who fail to smooth their consumption pro￿les (in response to government spending
shocks). As a bottom line, changes in private-sector ￿nance compete with changes in monetary and ￿scal
policies as candidate explanations for the observed decline in the e⁄ects of U.S. government spending.
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understanding of how and why ￿scal transmission changed during the early 1980s seems valuable in its
own right but also with respect to the more general changes in business cycle behavior that have come
to be called the "Great Moderation". Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000)
were the ￿rst to highlight a marked decrease in the volatility of economic activity since the mid-1980s.
Several subsequent papers, including Stock and Watson (2003) and Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004),
have attempted to explain the sources of this phenomenon, examining some of the same aspects that we
focus on, notably changes in macroeconomic policies and the behavior of the private sector.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. We begin by adding to the empirical evidence on ￿scal trans-
mission provided by Perotti (2005) and Mihov (2003). Speci￿cally, we estimate structural VARs on U.S.
time series for 1957:1-1979:2 (￿ S1￿ ) and 1983:1-2004:4 (￿ S2￿ ) and document the aforementioned reduction
in the strength and persistence of ￿scal policy e⁄ects on output, wages and private consumption. S1 and
S2 constitute appropriate samples for our study, because they allow us to characterize ￿scal policies before
and after any of the potentially important changes to monetary policy, government spending, ￿nancial
markets, and the business cycle in general. In the second step, we introduce a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model featuring price rigidities, monetary and ￿scal policies, as well as limited asset
market participation. Thus, the model nests all three possible explanations for di⁄erences in ￿scal trans-
mission across samples. Given that economic interest is centered on the impulse responses associated with
a government spending shock, we consider this statistic as the critical nexus between theory and data.
Accordingly, we rely on a minimum distance strategy that matches impulse responses from the theoretical
model with those obtained from the VARs. This procedure provides us with estimates for the parameters
of our model for both samples and thereby allows us to judge the quantitative importance of changes in
both household behavior and government policies. Similar estimation methods have been employed by
several other authors, although mostly in the context of monetary policy. The most prominent examples
are Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005); the ￿rst application
to the context of ￿scal policy is provided in a paper by Bouakez and Rebei (2003).2 Addressing a recent
criticism by Chari, Kehoe, McGrattan (2005) and others, we ensure in our analysis that the dynamics of
the theoretical model are fully nested in the VAR, so that the typical problem of omitted state variables
does not arise. Estimating our model for both samples, we allow policy parameters and the extent of
asset market participation to vary, while all deep parameters (pertaining to preferences and technology)
are assumed to remain unchanged. This enables us, in the third step, to run counterfactual experiments
by which we evaluate the three candidate explanations for the changes in ￿scal policy transmission.
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economy for which we obtain theoretical impulse responses. Section 3 looks at the empirical counterpart,
presenting our data, our structural VAR and the associated empirical impulse responses. Our estimation
strategy is detailed in section 4, which is followed by a discussion of the results in section 5. In section 6,
we present several counterfactual experiments that shed light on the importance of di⁄erent explanations
for our ￿ndings. Finally, section 7 summarizes the paper and provides a conclusion.
2 The Model
The model, which draws on both Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2005) and Bilbiie and Straub (2004b),
is a standard cashless DSGE model with sticky prices that, in addition, features limited asset market
participation.3 Apart from a continuum of households, there is a continuum of monopolistically compet-
itive producers which set prices on a staggered basis. Moreover, the model speci￿es two policy-makers.
A monetary authority sets its policy instrument, the nominal interest rate. A ￿scal policy authority
purchases the consumption good, raises lump-sum and income taxes and issues nominal debt.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households [0;1] consuming the ￿nal good: We assume that a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of
households smooth consumption by participating in asset markets - these households are ￿ asset holders￿ .
Speci￿cally, they trade a riskless one-period bond and hold shares in ￿rms. The rest of the households on
the [0;￿] interval do not participate in asset markets - we dub them ￿ non-asset holders￿ . This distinction
between households is assumed to arise not from preferences but from their actual capacity (or lack
thereof) to participate in asset markets, as in Bilbiie (2005).4 The most important causes for limited asset
market participation appear to be concrete institutional constraints like the ones described in Mishkin
(1991). While we do not take a stand as to what are the deep reasons underlying such institutional
constraints, we view them as a plausible aspect of reality and try to assess their empirical relevance in
explaining the e⁄ects of government spending shocks.
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Each asset holder on the [￿;1] interval chooses consumption CA;t, leisure LA;t and nominal bond holdings













subject to the budget constraint
R
￿1
t BA;t+1 + PtCA;t + PtTt = BA;t + (1 ￿ ￿)(WtNA;t + PtDA;t); (2)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the discount factor. Rt is the gross nominal return on bonds purchased in
period t, Pt denotes the price level, Wt the nominal wage, and DA;t represents real dividend payments to
households who own shares in the monopolistically competitive ￿rms. NA;t are hours worked by the asset
holder; they are given by NA;t = 1￿LA;t; where time endowment has been normalized to one. We further
assume that the income tax rate ￿ is constant, and that real lump-sum taxes Tt are adjusted according to
a rule speci￿ed below. Note that the utility function in (1) is non-separable in consumption and leisure
and belongs to the King-Plosser-Rebelo class, being consistent with balanced growth. Maximizing utility
(1) subject to (2) implies the ￿rst order conditions
R
￿1































subject to the condition that consumption expenditure equals net income,
PtCN;t = (1 ￿ ￿)WtNN;t ￿ PtTt: (7)
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Note that we have assumed preference homogeneity: ’ and ￿ are the same for both types of households.
This is consistent with the view that the only source of heterogeneity among households is their access
to asset markets, which can be limited due to exogenous institutional constraints. We also assume that
hours worked in steady state are the same for both types of households, NA = NN = N: This assumption,
while simplifying the analytics considerably, is largely innocuous for our results; since the focus of our
paper is on the dynamic responses to shocks, steady-state di⁄erences between the two types of agents are
of secondary importance. Moreover, evidence concerning the relationship between average hours worked
and wealth is, to the best of our knowledge, lacking. Because of preference homogeneity, marginal rates
of substitution are equalized and hence consumption shares in steady state are equal across groups,
CA = CN = C; this requires that steady-state asset income be zero.5 See Appendix A for details.
2.2 Firms
Final output is produced by a representative competitive ￿rm. This ￿rm purchases di⁄erentiated interme-
diate goods i 2 [0;1] from monopolistically competitive producers and combines them into the ￿nal good.










where Yt (i) denotes the quantity used of di⁄erentiated good i at time t. The ￿nal-goods ￿rm maximizes
pro￿ts PtYt￿
R 1
0 Pt (i)Yt(i)di, where Pt is the overall price index for the ￿nal good and Pt (i) denotes the
price of intermediate good i. This implies downward-sloping demand for each intermediate input:
Yt(i) = (Pt (i)=Pt)
￿" Yt; (10)






The monopolistically competitive producers of intermediate goods face a technology which is linear
in labor and subject to a ￿xed cost F:
Yt(i) = Nt(i) ￿ F; if Nt(i) > F; otherwise Yt(i) = 0: (11)
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Real pro￿ts of a generic ￿rm are thus given by Ot (i) ￿ [Pt (i)=Pt]Yt (i)￿[Wt=Pt]Nt (i): Following Calvo
(1983) and Yun (1996), intermediate-good ￿rms are assumed to adjust their prices infrequently. We
de￿ne ￿ as the probability of keeping the price constant in a given period. This exogenous probability
is independent of past price adjustments. Accordingly, with probability (1 ￿ ￿), the ￿rm is able to




￿s￿t;t+s [Pt(i)Yt;t+s(i) ￿ Wt+sYt;t+s(i)]
subject to the demand function (10). Recall from (4) that ￿t;t+s denotes the stochastic discount factor












In equilibrium each producer who sets a new price Pt(i) in period t will choose the same price and the
same level of output.
2.3 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is characterized by an interest rate feedback rule whereby the nominal interest rate Rt
is a function ￿(:) of expected in￿ ation:
Rt = ￿(Et￿t+1); (13)
where ￿t+1 ￿ Pt+1=Pt denotes gross in￿ ation between t and t+1. The constant elasticity of the feedback
function, ￿￿, governs the response of interest rates to expected in￿ ation.
2.4 Fiscal policy
The ￿scal authority purchases consumption goods, Gt, raises distortionary and lump-sum taxes and issues




t Bt+1 = Bt + Pt [Gt ￿ ￿Yt ￿ Tt]: (14)
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that government spending follows an exogenous AR(2) process,
gt = ￿1gt￿1 + ￿2gt￿2 + "t; (15)
which allows for a hump shaped response of spending to "t; an i.i.d. government spending shock with
time-invariant variance ￿2
":
The ￿nancing of government expenditure is determined by a de￿cit rule. Let Dt = Gt￿Tt￿￿Yt denote
the primary de￿cit, i.e. total non-interest spending less revenues. We also de￿ne the structural de￿cit,
Ds;t, as the primary de￿cit adjusted for automatic responses of tax revenues resulting from deviations
of output from its steady-state value: Ds;t = Dt + ￿ (Yt ￿ Y ) = Gt ￿ Tt ￿ ￿Y . To ensure consistency
with the empirical counterpart of the model (and for ease of comparison with other empirical studies), we
divide the de￿cit and debt variables by output Yt:6 Letting ^ ds;t denote a ￿rst order Taylor approximation
of Ds;t=Yt around the steady state, we assume that the structural de￿cit is adjusted according to the
following rule:
^ ds;t = ￿ ^ ds;t￿1 + ￿gGY gt + ￿b^ bt; (16)
where ^ bt ￿ Bt=(Pt￿1Yt￿1) is real debt divided by last period￿ s output, so that it remains a state variable:
Rules of this type have been studied extensively, see e.g. Bohn (1998) and Gal￿ and Perotti (2003).
The parameter ￿ captures the possibility that budget decisions are autocorrelated, while the parameter
￿g measures the degree of de￿cit ￿nance of temporary increases in government spending. For ease of
interpretation, we rescale the coe¢ cient on spending with the steady-state share of government spending
in output, GY . Thus all variables are in output units. Finally, the parameter ￿b governs the response of
the de￿cit to the beginning-of-period ratio of debt to GDP, hence capturing a ￿ debt stabilization￿motive:
a negative value of ￿b indicates that de￿cits are adjusted in order to stabilize outstanding debt.
2.5 Equilibrium, market clearing and aggregation
A rational expectations equilibrium is a sequence of processes for all prices and quantities introduced above
such that the optimality conditions hold for all agents and all markets clear at any given time t. Speci￿-
cally, market clearing requires that labor demand equal total labor supply, Nt = ￿NN;t+(1 ￿ ￿)NA;t, all
pro￿t income be distributed as dividends to shareholders (asset holders) and all government debt be held
by asset holders, Bt+1 = (1￿￿)BA;t+1. By Walras￿law, then, the goods market also clears: Ct+Gt = Yt,
where aggregate consumption is Ct ￿ ￿CN;t + (1 ￿ ￿)CA;t. We solve numerically a locally approximate
13
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(log-linear) version of the model around its non-stochastic steady state, see Appendix B for details.2.6 Government spending shocks and consumption
This subsection describes the intuition behind ￿scal transmission in our model. For a formal presentation
of all the e⁄ects outlined in this section, see the loglinearized version of the Euler equations in Appendix
B. To begin with, consider the case in which utility is separable (￿ ! 1).7 Note that an increase
in government spending will generally depress the consumption of asset holders because of a negative
wealth e⁄ect resulting from the induced increase in the tax burden (in present value terms). In the case
of an active monetary policy, i.e. for ￿￿ > 1, there is an additional substitution e⁄ect operating in the
same direction; this is triggered by a rise in the real interest rate as the increase in government spending
leads to a rise in in￿ ation. These channels of transmission are at the heart of the analysis in standard
business cycle models, e.g. Baxter and King (1993) and Linnemann and Schabert (2003). They generally
induce a crowding out of private consumption in response to higher government spending.
In contrast, in the present model it is possible for total private consumption to increase, the basic
mechanism relying upon a strong enough increase in the real wage. In fact, a higher real wage induces an
increase in the consumption of non-asset holders, which may eventually more than o⁄set the fall in the
consumption of asset holders. Note in this context that the reliance upon a strong conditional response of
the real wage to government spending shocks does not contradict the notorious unconditional acyclicality
of real wages (see the discussion in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992))8.
The response of the real wage naturally depends on the interplay of labor supply and demand. To
begin with, a government spending shock increases the demand for goods. With sticky prices ￿ la Calvo,
this has an e⁄ect on labor demand: ￿rms who cannot change their price will adjust quantities, hence
shifting labor demand at a given wage (the rest of the ￿rms will increase their prices, creating in￿ ation).
This e⁄ect is larger, the larger the degree of price stickiness (and is absent with ￿ exible prices). Meanwhile,
labor supply shifts for two di⁄erent reasons. First, there is a direct income e⁄ect on the labor supply of
non-asset holders who are willing to work more as the tax burden increases. This shift can be avoided
on impact if spending is de￿cit-￿nanced, because the path of taxation matters for non-asset holders.
Second, asset holders also increase labor supply for a given wage: this is due both to the wealth e⁄ect
- asset holders internalize the government budget constraint - and to intertemporal substitution. The
latter e⁄ect occurs if an increase in in￿ ation triggers an increase in the real interest rate, thus providing
incentives for asset holders to postpone consumption. Consequently, the overall shift in labor supply is
smaller, the smaller: i) the persistence of the government spending shock: lower persistence reduces the
14
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activism: a less aggressive monetary policy implies a lower real interest rate and thereby weakens asset
holders￿incentives to postpone consumption; and iii) the degree of de￿cit ￿nancing: de￿cit ￿nancing
reduces the wealth e⁄ect on non-asset holders.
When the shift in labor demand dominates the shift in labor supply (which also requires that the
latter be su¢ ciently inelastic), a high enough increase in the real wage may obtain and cause aggregate
consumption to increase. Note, however, that a strong increase in the real wage does not necessarily lead
to a rise in aggregate consumption. In fact, there is the o⁄setting e⁄ect of a high increase in marginal costs
and a resulting fall in pro￿ts, which additionally depresses the consumption of asset holders. Furthermore,
while de￿cit ￿nancing works towards ensuring a positive consumption response in most cases, this is not a
general result. Due to limited asset market participation, de￿cits have a negative e⁄ect on asset holders￿
consumption above and beyond the standard wealth e⁄ect associated with the present discounted value of
government spending. Speci￿cally, an increase in debt siphons further resources away from the potential
consumption of asset holders, since they will end up holding all debt issued by the government. For
asset holders, this amount - in per capita terms - exceeds the debt level of the government by a factor of
￿=(1 ￿ ￿), because non-asset holders do not hold any debt.
When utility is non-separable (￿ 6= 1), there is an additional channel changing the co-movement
between consumption and hours of asset holders. Speci￿cally, if ￿ > 1, hours and consumption will
co-move positively: for a given increase in the real wage, asset holders substitute out of leisure into
consumption. Thus, the negative wealth e⁄ect that induces an increase in hours worked can also induce
an increase in consumption. Moreover, ￿ > 1 reduces the elasticity of asset holders￿consumption to real
interest rate movements, since it implies a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution. As a result,
asset holders have weaker incentives to postpone consumption for a given increase in real interest rates.
All things considered, the discussion makes clear that even a relatively parsimonious speci￿cation may
generate quite complex interactions between the di⁄erent features of the model. In our view, this further
increases the promise of estimating the model￿ s parameters by means of a minimum distance procedure
that ensures the greatest possible match between the model￿ s theoretical predictions and important
empirical regularities in the data.
15
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3.1 VAR speci￿cation
Having introduced our theoretical model, we now turn to the empirical characterization of ￿scal trans-
mission, i.e. the e⁄ects of a temporary increase in government spending as inferred from the data.
Speci￿cally, we use a VAR framework to obtain estimates of the empirical impulse response functions
associated with a government spending shock.
As our goal is to estimate the structural parameters of our model by minimizing the distance between
theoretical and empirical impulse responses, we have to ensure that the VAR actually captures the
empirical equivalent of the dynamics implied by our theory. In other words, the log-linear model ought
to be nested in our VAR. This has two implications. First, the identifying restrictions we use in our VAR
have to be consistent with the model. In the VAR literature on ￿scal transmission, shocks to government
spending have been identi￿ed on the assumption that government spending is not contemporaneously
a⁄ected by the other variables included in the VAR.9 We rely on the same identifying assumption, thereby
conforming with the theoretical model, where government spending is assumed to follow an exogenous
AR(2) process. Moreover, like in the model, we allow all variables in the VAR (including debt, which is
de￿ned as end-of-period debt) to respond contemporaneously to government spending shocks. In practice,
we estimate a recursive VAR where government spending is ordered ￿rst and interpret the residual from
the ￿rst equation of the VAR as a structural innovation to government spending. Following Perotti
(2005), such an interpretation can be justi￿ed by observing that discretionary ￿scal policy plausibly does
not respond within a quarter to a change in the economy as re￿ ected by an output innovation. Likewise,
automatic stabilization is unlikely to occur within one quarter, given that our de￿nition of government
spending comprises government consumption and government investment but does not include transfer
payments.
Second, the solution of the log-linearized model implies a state-space system in which all variables are
functions of the current state only. The set of state variables in our model comprises current government
debt and its lagged value along with the lagged value of output10 as well as the current value and ￿rst
two lags of government spending. It is therefore desirable to include this full set of variables in the VAR.
In doing so we explicitly address the issue raised in a recent critique of the Structural VAR approach by
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005). These authors show by way of a Monte Carlo exercise that the
omission of a state variable from a VAR may cause a severe bias in estimated impulse response functions.
The fact that we include the relevant states in our VAR resolves this potential problem and ensures that
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the model dynamics are actually nested in the empirical speci￿cation.Government debt and government spending are, therefore, the two ￿scal variables in our VAR. As
the real wage response plays an important role in the transmission of spending shocks, we also include
this variable. Eventually, our VAR model comprises ￿ve variables: government spending, output, wages,
private consumption, and government debt. Spending, output and consumption are expressed in logs of
real per capita terms, real wages are in logs, and debt is given as a share of output. We include four lags
of each variable together with a constant and remove a linear time trend from all variables except the
debt ratio.11
As discussed above, earlier studies such as Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and FatÆs and Mihov (2001)
have reported a substantial increase in private consumption in response to a government spending shock.12
However, new evidence by Perotti (2005) and Mihov (2003) suggests that the transmission of ￿scal shocks
changed substantially in the early 1980s. In order to trace these changes, we consider a sample split around
the year 1980. However, the possibility of structural breaks in other economic areas should be taken into
account, as well. Speci￿cally, given the prominent role of monetary policy in our subsequent analysis, we
decide to end the ￿rst sample in 1979:2, i.e. just before the beginning of the Volcker chairmanship. The
second sample then starts in 1983:1, i.e. just after the Volcker disin￿ ation period. This sample split also
seems appropriate with respect to the evidence on two other phenomena that are relevant for our study,
namely the ￿nancial liberalization occurring in the early 1980s and the general changes in business-cycle
dynamics dated, again, in the early- to mid-1980s. Hence we estimate VARs on U.S. time series data for
the two samples: 1957:1-1979:2 (S1) and 1983:1-2004:4 (S2).
3.2 Empirical impulse responses
Figure 1 displays the impulse response functions of all ￿ve variables to a one percent increase in govern-
ment spending for both S1 (left column) and S2 (right column). While the solid crossed lines indicate
point estimates, the shaded areas represent symmetric 90 percent con￿dence intervals, computed by
bootstrapping based on 1,000 replications.
In the ￿rst row, the response of government spending can be seen to display greater persistence in S1
compared to S2. This is in line with an earlier ￿nding reported by Perotti (2005). Output, shown in the
next row, features impact (maximum) increases of 0:33 (0:51) percent in S1 and of 0:20 (0:25) percent
in S2. The responses are signi￿cant in both samples, but only in S1 does the increase stay signi￿cant
for an extended period of about two years. The response of the real wage is reported in the third row.
Here a signi￿cant increase can be observed only for the ￿rst sample. Note that this seems consistent with
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and VallØs (2005) also report an increase in the real wage on the basis of a VAR on U.S. data from
1954-1998. The results for the period 1960-1996 examined by FatÆs and Mihov (2001), in turn, depend
on the precise wage measure under study. While most of the measures rise in response to a spending
shock, only manufacturing wages do so signi￿cantly.
The fourth row depicts the response of consumption. Although the point estimates for the ￿rst few
periods look rather similar, the response is signi￿cantly positive in S1 for about two years, but not so in
S2. This accords qualitatively with the earlier ￿ndings of Mihov (2003) and Perotti (2005) regarding a
weaker response of private consumption in S2 relative to S1. However, the most striking di⁄erence across
samples consists in the much greater persistence of the e⁄ect in S1.
The last set of panels pertain to the response of government debt (measured at the end of the period)
as a ratio of GDP. Here the di⁄erences across samples are most remarkable: in S1 the debt ratio falls
signi￿cantly in response to an increase in government spending, whereas in S2 a signi￿cant increase in
the debt ratio can be observed. This ￿nding seems again consistent with Perotti (2005), although he does
not consider debt but tax revenues in the VAR. Speci￿cally, Perotti notes that the cumulative net tax
response to a spending shock is typically positive in S1 and negative in S2.13
Another way to summarize the evidence is provided by table 1, which reports the cumulated impulse
responses, for 4, 12 and 20 quarters for all variables and both samples. Standard errors computed
by bootstrapping based on 1,000 replications are reported below the respective point estimates. Most
interestingly, the cumulative responses of consumption and output after 20 quarters in S2 are less than half
the cumulative responses in S1. Substantial di⁄erences are also apparent for government spending itself
and even more for the cumulative wage response. The right column of table 1 reports the di⁄erences
in the cumulative responses between both samples. For all variables and at almost all horizons, the
di⁄erences amount to at least one to two standard errors.
Overall, our results add corroborating evidence to the observations reported by Perotti (2005) and
Mihov (2003). A comparison of both samples points towards a substantial change in the transmission
of spending shocks. In particular, the responses of output and consumption are less signi￿cant and
less persistent in the post-1980 sample. Government spending itself also shows less persistence in S2.
Likewise, real wages increase over an extended period in S1 but only brie￿ y in S2. Lastly, the responses
of government debt indicate a change in the ￿nancing of a typical government spending shock: while in
S1 an increase in government expenditure is associated with a fall in the debt ratio, in S2 the opposite
holds, indicating a greater reliance upon de￿cit ￿nancing.
18
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 582
January 20064 Estimating the Structural Model
4.1 Minimum distance strategy
The next step of our analysis consists in matching empirical (VAR) and theoretical (DSGE) impulse
responses in order to obtain estimates for the parameters of our model. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
were the ￿rst to suggest this minimum distance technique in the context of DSGE models. Similar
approaches have subsequently been applied by Amato and Laubach (2003), Boivin and Giannoni (2003)
and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
Generally, one important question in minimum distance estimation concerns the issue of which mo-
ments or auxiliary statistics to match. From an econometric point of view, the moments used in estimation
should be as informative as possible, in the sense of bearing strong and distinct relationships with each
of the structural parameters. Unfortunately, it is often di¢ cult to evaluate this property in a stringent
way. In addition, this is not the only relevant criterion for choosing moments. From an economic point
of view, the moments should also be important in their own right. This means, in particular, that they
should represent aspects of the data on which economic interest is centered, e.g. because they are clearly
linked with important theories or because they matter most for economic policy.
In the case of ￿scal policy that we study, a crucial issue is the response of output and its components to
a shock in government spending. Moreover, since the real wage plays a central role in the transmission of
￿scal shocks in our theoretical model (see Section 2.6), its behavior is of particular interest, as well. Indeed,
both the direction and the size of these responses represent important benchmarks on which to measure
the descriptive quality of competing models. Accordingly, we consider, as the relevant feature to match,
the full set of empirical impulse response functions presented in the previous section. Note that in doing
so we concentrate on the propagation of one particular shock, whose identi￿cation is consistent with both
our theoretical model and a number of prominent contributions in the empirical literature. Consequently,
this strategy allows us to avoid making restrictive assumptions on the nature and interaction of all other
possible shocks in the economy, as would be required, for example, in maximum likelihood estimation.
Formally, de￿ne ￿e to be the empirical impulse response function characterizing the data. Note that
it is not a raw moment but a transformation of the estimates obtained from a VAR that nests the log-
linearized model. The model itself, in turn, assigns to each admissible vector of structural parameters
￿ a theoretical impulse response function ￿t = ￿(￿). The binding function ￿() must be assumed to
be injective to ensure identi￿cation. We obtain an estimate for the parameter vector of interest, b ￿, by
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b ￿ = argmin(￿e ￿ ￿(￿))
0 W (￿e ￿ ￿(￿)); (17)
where W represents a positive de￿nite weighting matrix.
As the relationship between structural parameters and the implied impulse response functions is non-
linear, we rely on numerical methods to obtain a solution for (17). Basically, ￿(￿) is evaluated repeatedly
for di⁄erent parameter vectors ￿ until the closest ￿t with the empirical impulse responses, ￿e, has been
obtained.
Our choice of the weighting matrix W is guided by the idea of giving greater weight to impulse
responses that are more precisely estimated. Thus we opt for the diagonal matrix Wdiag whose diagonal
entries are the reciprocal values of the variance of the empirical impulse responses. Using this weighting
matrix ensures that the theoretical impulse responses are made to be as close to the empirical ones as
possible, in terms of point-wise standard deviations. Finally, regarding the length of the impulse response
series, we decide to consider the ￿rst 16 quarters for all ￿ve variables.
Standard errors for b ￿ are computed using the following expression for the asymptotic variance of our











where G = r￿￿t represents the Jacobian of the impulse response function generated from the model and
b ￿ denotes the bootstrap-estimated variance matrix of the impulse responses.
4.2 Parametric setup
We partition the parameters of our structural model in three groups. The ￿rst group comprises parameters
that can be ￿xed before the actual estimation exercise, because their values are uncontroversial or easily
inferred from ￿rst moments of the data. Speci￿cally, this is true for the time discount rate ￿ which we
set to 1:03￿1=4, matching the inverse of the steady-state gross real rate of return at quarterly frequency.
Further, we set the share of government expenditure in GDP, GY , to 0:2 and the steady-state tax rate,
￿, to 0:3. Together with the assumption that the steady-state share of debt is zero, BPY = 0, these pin
down lump-sum transfers in steady state. The elasticity of substitution " is chosen such that the markup
in steady state equals 20 percent. Lastly, we assume that, in steady state, agents spend one fourth of
their time endowment working.
All remaining parameters could, in principle, be estimated using our minimum distance strategy.
20
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 582
January 2006
minimizing the weighted distance between empirical and theoretical impulse response functions, i.e. ￿eHowever, given the set of moments we exploit, certain parameters would not be particularly well identi￿ed,
so we ￿nd it preferable to ￿x them at values that have been established in the previous literature. This
also helps us to keep the dimension of our optimization problem tractable. Speci￿cally, we ￿x ￿, the
probability that prices are not changed in a given period, at 0:85; a value in the middle of the range
reported for di⁄erent speci￿cations by Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), who apply single-equation estimation
techniques to the New Keynesian Phillips curve.14 Similarly, we ￿x ￿, which measures the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, at a conventional value of two.
The third set of parameters comprises those that we actually seek to estimate. These are: the Taylor
rule coe¢ cient ￿￿, the parameters governing ￿scal policy, i.e. ￿1;￿2;￿g;￿b and ￿, as well as the share of
non-asset holders, ￿. All of these parameters are allowed to vary across the two samples. In total, we
thus provide estimates for 14 parameters.
Finally, we have to consider that certain parameter con￿gurations could imply equilibrium indetermi-
nacy in our theoretical model.15 In this case, we resort to the minimal state variable criterion suggested
by McCallum (1999) in order to select an equilibrium and compute the corresponding impulse responses.
5 Results
Table 2 provides the results of our estimation exercise for both samples. Standard errors are reported
below the respective point estimates. Almost all parameters are estimated with satisfactory precision,
although the di⁄erences between estimates for the two samples tend to remain below the usual levels of
statistical signi￿cance. Importantly, note that the set of estimates imply a determinate equilibrium for
each sample, despite our estimation procedure allowing for indeterminacy.
Perhaps the most interesting single parameter, the estimated extent of asset market participation
di⁄ers considerably across periods. Speci￿cally, the share of consumers who do not smooth consumption
by trading in assets is estimated at a signi￿cant b ￿ = 0:51 in S1 and at insigni￿cant 0:35 in S2. This
￿nding is consistent with the notion that access to asset markets has widened over the last two decades,
with potentially important consequences for the transmission of ￿scal policy. In our view, the increase
in asset market participation that speaks from our exercise can be related to important institutional
changes occurring at the beginning of the 1980s. Some of the suggestive evidence regarding these changes
was already mentioned in the introduction; for further details see Mishkin (1991) and Bilbiie and Straub
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rate is adjusted in response to expected in￿ ation, the parameter ￿￿ being estimated at 1:01 for S1 and
1:77 for S2. Note again in this context that our estimate of ￿￿ has not been restricted to be greater
than one and that parameter con￿gurations implying equilibrium indeterminacy have been admitted
throughout. Still, our procedure turns out to deliver an estimate that actually implies a determinate and
unique equilibrium.16 Interestingly, the estimates are even fairly close to those reported by Clarida, Gal￿
and Gertler (2000). Using single equation techniques, these authors report an implied long-run response
coe¢ cient of 1:58 for a post-82 sample, while their corresponding estimate for data up to 1979 is 0:83.
In line with the literature, our results thus suggest that the Fed has adopted a stronger anti-in￿ ationary
stand under Chairmen Volcker and Greenspan compared to their predecessors in the 1960s and 1970s.
Turning to the parameters characterizing ￿scal policy, note ￿rst that the estimates for ￿b of ￿0:07
and ￿0:11 in sample S1 and S2, respectively, imply a tendency towards debt stabilization: in response to
a higher level of debt the structural de￿cit is reduced in both samples. The order of magnitude of these
estimates is in line with results obtained by Bohn (1998) using single equation techniques. The second
important ￿scal-policy parameter, ￿g, governs the degree of de￿cit ￿nance associated with a government
spending shock. Here, we observe a substantial change across samples, the estimate rising from 0:17 to
0:64; suggesting an increase in the reliance on de￿cits to ￿nance an extra spending unit. This result
clearly re￿ ects the strong increase in debt which, according to the empirical impulse responses, follows
a sudden increase in government spending in S2 but not in S1. Next, the autoregressive parameter ￿
is estimated to increase from 0:50 to 0:71 from S1 to S2, implying greater persistence of de￿cits in the
second sample. These values are higher than the 0:25 reported in Gal￿ and Perotti (2003), who use single-
equation techniques and allow the de￿cit to respond to the output gap instead of government spending.
Finally, ￿1 is estimated to be 1:03 (S1) and 0:64 (S2), while ￿2 is estimated to be ￿0:07 (S1) and 0:27
(S2). These coe¢ cients sum up to 0:96 and 0:91, respectively, indicating the higher persistence of the
spending response in S1.
Taken together, our estimation exercise provides a set of parameter values that strike us as plausible
and insightful. The estimates indicate that the principal changes from S1 to S2 consist of widened
private access to asset markets, more hawkish monetary policy, and a greater degree of de￿cit ￿nance.
The goal of the next section will be to relate these changes in institutions and policies to the di⁄erences
in ￿scal transmission that are visible from the empirical impulse responses in ￿gure 1. Speci￿cally, in a
model-based counterfactual analysis we attempt to evaluate which of the three factors - asset markets,
monetary policy, or ￿scal policy itself - have been pivotal for the observed decline in the e⁄ects of
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to give a reasonably good account of the dynamic responses in the data. The low criterion function
minima reported in table 2 already suggest that the theoretical impulse responses do not di⁄er too much
from the empirical ones in terms of point-wise standard deviations. Graphically, the good ￿t can be seen
from ￿gure 1, where we reproduce the impulse responses implied by the parameter estimates of table 2
(straight lines). The ￿gure clearly shows that the model accounts quite well for the VAR-based evidence
on ￿scal transmission. Both the magnitude and the persistence of the impulse responses are replicated,
and the model-based responses remain consistently within the empirical con￿dence intervals. While in
S1 ￿scal policy has a strong and persistent e⁄ect on output, wages and consumption, these e⁄ects are
less signi￿cant and considerably less persistent in S2. The behavior of debt in the data is also matched
by the model responses.
6 Model-Based Counterfactual Analysis
One neat implication of working with a structural model of the macroeconomy is that well-de￿ned pol-
icy experiments can be considered in a way that is less prone to the Lucas critique than counterfactual
simulations of reduced-form models. Speci￿cally, keeping constant the model structure and deep para-
meters across samples, we are in a position to explore various possible causes for the apparent changes
in the transmission of ￿scal shocks. To do so, we rely on counterfactual experiments similar in spirit to
the exercises provided by Boivin and Giannoni (2003) and Stock and Watson (2003) in the context of
monetary policy.
Basically, we seek to assess three hypotheses for why ￿scal policy may have weaker e⁄ects in S2: i)





in the monetary regime as re￿ ected in the parameter ￿￿; iii) an increase in asset market participation,
i.e. the estimated fall in ￿:17 Of course, the full extent of changes between S1 and S2 can only be
accounted for by simultaneous variation of all estimated parameters. Put di⁄erently, there are possibly
important interactions between di⁄erent parameters, so the observed di⁄erences between S1 and S2 are not
simply the sum of the e⁄ects of univariate parameter changes. Although our subsequent analysis cannot
investigate all of the possible cross e⁄ects, we consider two distinct experiments involving parameter
changes that seem of particular interest.
In the ￿rst experiment, we vary one parameter at a time from its estimated S1 value to its estimated
S2 value while leaving all other parameters unchanged. The goal is to evaluate the impact on the model￿ s
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counterfactual responses close to the ￿tted S2 curves, it should arguably be interpreted as a key factor
driving di⁄erences across the two samples. In the second, complementary experiment we vary, each time,
all parameters except one from their estimated S1 to S2 values, thereby assessing the degree to which
the transmission of ￿scal shocks would di⁄er from what is actually observed in S2, had one parameter
of interest stayed unchanged at its S1 value. Among other things, we expect this experiment to reveal
which parameter changes may be relatively unimportant for the overall change in transmission from S1
to S2.
Figures 2 and 3 contain the results for the ￿rst and second experiment, respectively. To illustrate what
is to be accounted for, i.e. the di⁄erences in propagation according to our estimates, the ￿rst column
of each ￿gure displays the theoretical impulse responses of all ￿ve variables based on the respective
parameter estimates for S1 and S2. As stated before, all variables display much less persistent responses
in S2, with the response of the debt ratio even changing sign.
To begin with, consider the experiment depicted in ￿gure 2. The panels in column b) display the
responses corresponding to the S1 parameter estimates along with the ￿rst set of counterfactual responses.
The latter result from an evaluation of the model based on all parameters taking their S1 values except
￿, which is reduced from 0:51 to its S2 value of 0:35: This experiment is meant to gauge the e⁄ect
of a counterfactual increase in asset market participation from 49 to 65 percent in the early sample.
As a main result, the responses can be seen to exhibit substantially lower persistence.18 Greater asset
market participation allows more households to internalize the government budget constraint, reducing
the cumulative e⁄ects of government spending on consumption, output and the real wage relative to the
S1 baseline case. To the extent that the consumption and output responses are muted, the increase in
asset market participation works towards explaining the smaller e⁄ect of government spending actually
observed in S2.
However, this result has to be put into perspective by considering our next experiment. The pan-
els in column c) display the consequences of varying the degree of monetary policy activism, i.e. the
e⁄ect of increasing ￿￿ from 1:01 to 1:77: Compared to the previous results, the observed change in re-
sponses is much more dramatic now, especially for consumption. Clearly, had monetary policy been more
anti-in￿ ationary in S1, a typical increase in government expenditure, by inducing in￿ ation, would have
triggered higher nominal interest rates and caused households to postpone spending. This would have
dampened consumption, output and the real wage enough to drive the responses close to or even below
the levels actually observed for S2. In this sense, the estimated change in monetary policy should be
24
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 582
January 2006seen as a quantitatively powerful factor pushing results in the right direction, i.e. a smaller expansionary
impact of government spending after 1980. Notice, however, that the precise shape of the counterfactual
responses still di⁄ers noticeably from the actual evidence for S2.
The last three columns consider changes in the conduct of ￿scal policy itself. First, in column d) we
compare the ￿tted S1 responses with what would have happened if the process of government expenditure
had been less persistent. Speci￿cally, we now change both ￿1 and ￿2 to their respective S2 values, while
all other parameters stay at their S1 levels. It turns out that output increases by less than under the
S1 baseline scenario if the lower persistence of the S2 spending process is assumed. The consumption
response becomes weaker, as well. Although these e⁄ects point in the right direction, they remain
relatively limited.
In contrast, changing the value of ￿ from 0:50 to 0:71, i.e. assuming that de￿cits had been more
persistent in S1, would actually amplify the e⁄ects of government spending on most variables. This
result is shown in column e). Seen in isolation, it does not appear to align with the observed changes in
transmission between S1 and S2, except for the mitigating e⁄ect on the fall in debt. A similar ￿nding is
obtained when we evaluate the consequences of altering the degree of de￿cit ￿nance. For this purpose,
we set the relevant parameter ￿g from its S1 value of 0:17 to the higher S2 value of 0:64: The panels in
column f) show that, while this change would induce much stronger positive responses of all variables
(contrary to what is seen in the data), it is crucial to account for the rise in debt observed in the second
sample.
Overall, the ￿rst experiment illustrates why the candidate explanations are in fact complementary.
Had government spending been as de￿cit-￿nanced in S1 as in S2 and had de￿cits been as persistent, the
e⁄ects of spending shocks would have been even stronger. If, in reality, we ￿nd the e⁄ects of ￿scal shocks
to have declined, this indicates the presence of important o⁄setting factors. In particular, our results
suggest that a combination of increased asset market participation and a more active monetary policy
have tended to reduce the expansionary impact of government spending shocks.
Figure 3 provides the results of our second experiment, where we assess the impact of a change in all
but one parameters from their estimated S1 to S2 values relative to the ￿tted S2 responses. The main
purpose of this exercise is to understand how the transmission of ￿scal shocks in S2 would look if one of
the estimated parameter changes had not occurred.
Column b) of ￿gure 3 illustrates that, without the change in asset market participation (column b),
the impact e⁄ect of a ￿scal shock would be much lower (and even of the opposite sign) than what is
actually observed in S2. Moreover, the shape and persistence of the responses would be severely a⁄ected:
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period of interest. This reinforces our previous insight that asset market participation is key to explaining
the change in the dynamic pattern and persistence of the responses of consumption, wages and output.
In contrast, ignoring the change in the degree of monetary policy activism (column c) is immaterial
for the shapes of the responses - counterfactual and ￿tted S2 responses are largely parallel - whereas
it makes a substantial di⁄erence with respect to their magnitude: had ￿￿ remained at its S1 value,
the responses of consumption, wage and output would have been higher in S2 than our data show.
Consequently, monetary policy is con￿rmed as a quantitatively important factor driving the di⁄erences
in the propagation of ￿scal shocks between the two samples. The exception is the response of debt, for
which the change in ￿￿ seems to be largely irrelevant. Next, column d) displays the e⁄ects of leaving
out the change in the persistence of shocks. They are mostly similar, if smaller in magnitude, to those in
column b). However, the persistence of shocks is crucial for the response of debt, which would look far
too persistent in S2 without the estimated change in the stochastic shock process. Lastly, ignoring the
change in the persistence of de￿cits (column e) would imply missing the hump shapes in most responses.
The same is also true (and quantitatively more important) for the degree of de￿cit ￿nancing (column f).
Importantly, without the di⁄erent degrees of de￿cit ￿nancing across samples, it is impossible to explain
the distinct responses of debt.
In sum, our exercise yields a set of interesting observations. As documented in section 3, the changes
in the e⁄ects of government spending concern both the magnitude and the dynamic pattern of the
impulse responses. Our model-based analysis identi￿es di⁄erent key determinants for these two aspects
of the change in propagation. Speci￿cally, among the individual parameter changes that we consider, a
more active monetary policy appears to be the most powerful factor reducing the e⁄ects of ￿scal shocks
in the second sample. The dampening e⁄ect of a tougher anti-in￿ ationary stance is complemented by
greater asset market participation and less persistent spending shocks, although the latter two changes
are quantitatively less important. Especially the change in asset market participation is, however, crucial
to account for the changes in the shape and persistence of the responses of output, consumption and
the real wage. Similarly, in order to explain the radically di⁄erent dynamics of government debt across
samples, the change in the degree of de￿cit ￿nancing is paramount. Hence, while none of the candidate
explanations can by itself provide a full account of the changes in ￿scal transmission, our counterfactual
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In this paper, we make essentially two contributions. First, we add to the emerging evidence that the
transmission of government spending shocks in the U.S. economy has changed substantially in the post-
1980s. Second, we try to account for these changes by considering a DSGE model whose implications for
￿scal transmission are driven by a set of structural and institutional parameters.
To establish the stylized facts of ￿scal transmission, we consider a parsimonious VAR that is speci￿ed
in accordance with our theoretical model. The main ￿nding is that an exogenous increase in government
spending leads to a sustained rise in output, consumption and the real wage in the period 1957-79
but has less signi￿cant and much less persistent e⁄ects on these variables after 1982. Moreover, the
￿nancing of government spending shocks appears to have changed, as indicated by the distinct responses
of government debt across the two samples. Together, these results con￿rm earlier studies by Perotti
(2005) and Mihov (2003).
Why does U.S. ￿scal policy have less expansionary e⁄ects in the second sample? Starting from our
VAR-based evidence, we try to relate the di⁄erences in ￿scal transmission to important institutional
and policy changes in the U.S. economy. Clearly, our analysis must confront the Lucas critique, so
we resort to a structural model. Speci￿cally, we propose a New Keynesian DSGE model that features
limited asset market participation as a potential institutional explanation for di⁄erent degrees of ￿scal
policy e⁄ectiveness. In addition, the model encompasses simple speci￿cations of both ￿scal and monetary
policies, so several competing hypotheses can be taken into account as to the reasons for the observed
change in ￿scal transmission.
We take our structural model to the data by matching its implied impulse responses with those
obtained from the VAR. In contrast to other applications of minimum distance estimation, we ensure
that the model￿ s dynamics are fully nested in the VAR, thus addressing a recent critique of Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2005). Our approach provides us with estimates of the key policy and institutional
parameters for the two samples, while all deep parameters are held constant. The results suggest that
asset market participation increased noticeably in the post-1980s, in line with earlier informal evidence.
We also ￿nd that government spending has become less persistent but more de￿cit-￿nanced in the second
sample and that monetary policy has become more active.
Given these estimates, we carry out counterfactual experiments within the framework of our structural
model. Speci￿cally, we consider the quantitative impact of single policy or institutional reforms in order to
evaluate which of the candidate changes in the U.S. economic environment is most powerful in accounting
for the di⁄erences in ￿scal transmission before and after 1980. A ceteris-paribus increase in asset market
27
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 582
January 2006participation to the level estimated for the second sample leads to somewhat weaker output, consumption
and real wage e⁄ects of a government spending shock, thus explaining part of the decline in the e⁄ects of
￿scal shocks. Importantly, it also leads to a change in the shape of the impulse responses consistent with
that observed in the data. A similar, if more limited, impact can be ascribed to the estimated change in
the persistence of ￿scal shocks. However, the most important single determinant for the changes in ￿scal
policy transmission appears to be the change in monetary policy: apart from its other macroeconomic
implications, the stronger anti-in￿ ationary stance of the Volcker-Greenspan period has also acted to
reduce the expansionary e⁄ects of a surprise increase in government spending. Lastly, changes in the
persistence of budget de￿cits and the degree of de￿cit ￿nancing are another indispensable element of
the story, notably to explain the strikingly di⁄erent dynamics of debt across the two samples. Taken
together, these results highlight the importance of considering the interaction of monetary and ￿scal
policies, on the one hand, and the evolution of ￿nancial markets, on the other hand, in order to gain a
better understanding of how important shocks are transmitted in the economy.
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A Steady State
Here we calculate the coe¢ cients used in the log-linearized version of the model. For any variable Xt;
X denotes its steady-state value and XY its steady-state share in output, X=Y: The Euler equation (3)

























We assume that hours are the same for the two groups in the steady state, NN = NA = N. Because of
preference homogeneity (see section 2), we need to ensure that steady-state consumption shares are also







































TY = GY ￿ ￿:
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Speci￿cally, we ensure that asset income in steady state is zero. This requires assuming that the ￿xed






= CY = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ TY = 1 ￿ GY :
Next, we want to ￿nd hours in steady state. Given the equalization of hours and consumption between
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Given ￿ and GY , we choose steady-state N to match average hours worked. From (21), this implies a
unique value for ’:
B Log-Linearized Equilibrium
A local approximation of the model outlined in section 2 around its non-stochastic steady state delivers a
system of linear di⁄erence equations that can be solved numerically. We outline the log-linear equations
in this appendix. Small letters denote the log-deviation of a variable from its steady-state value, while
^ bt = Bt=(Pt￿1Yt￿1), ￿t = log(Pt=Pt￿1) and wt = log((Wt=Pt)=(W=P)). Given the process (15) and a
shock to government spending, "t, we consider the sequence for the set of variables
n
cA;t;cN;t;ct;yt;￿t;rt;wt;nA;t;nN;t;nt; ^ ds;t;^ bt;tt
o1
t=0
that satis￿es 13 conditions/de￿nitions to be listed in turn.
First, linearizing the Euler equation (3) and substituting steady-state hours from (21) gives
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January 2006For ￿ > 1; the elasticity of consumption growth (EtcA;t+1 ￿ cA;t) to hours growth (EtnA;t+1 ￿ nA;t) is
positive. In addition, the elasticity of consumption to the real interest rate is given by 1=￿: The labor
choice of asset holders (5), in log-deviations from steady state, satis￿es
N
1 ￿ N
nA;t = wt ￿ cA;t:
The linearized ￿rst-order condition and budget constraint, (8) and (7), for non-asset holders read as
N
1 ￿ N
nN;t = wt ￿ cN;t;
(1 ￿ GY )cN;t = (1 ￿ ￿)(wt + nN;t) ￿ TY tt:






1 ￿ GY + TY
(wt ￿ tt):
Since ￿TY > 0, hours of non-asset holders respond positively to increases in the real wage, wt, and taxes
relative to their steady-state value, TY tt.
Labor market clearing, using NA = NN = N, implies
nt = ￿nN;t + (1 ￿ ￿)nA;t;
while aggregate consumption is given by
ct = ￿cN;t + (1 ￿ ￿)cA;t:
Up to a ￿rst-order approximation, the aggregate production function (11) reads as
yt = (1 + FY )nt:
A log-linear approximation of the price setting problem (12), together with the de￿nition of the price
level, implies
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
wt:
Next, consider the government sector. An approximation to the government budget constraint (14)
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￿^ bt+1 = ^ bt + GY gt ￿ TY tt ￿ ￿yt:
In turn, an approximation to the de￿nition of the structural primary de￿cit divided by output ^ ds;t is
given by
^ ds;t = GY gt ￿ TY tt:
Our speci￿cation of the de￿cit rule (16) reads as
^ ds;t = ￿ ^ ds;t￿1 + ￿gGY gt + ￿b^ bt:
The monetary policy rule (13), in log deviations, is given by
rt = ￿￿Et￿t+1:
Finally, good market clearing implies
yt = GY gt + (1 ￿ GY )ct:
C A Model with Money
The purpose of this appendix is to show that the principal implications of our model remain una⁄ected
if we allow for money holdings by both agents and adopt a particular scheme for rebating seigniorage
revenues. This setup gives non-asset holders some room for smoothing consumption by holding money.




















;h0 > 0;h00 < 0;
while the budget constraints become, respectively:
R
￿1
t BA;t+1 + PtCA;t + PtTt + MA;t
= BA;t + MA;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(WtNA;t + PtDA;t) + PtSA;t;
PtCN;t + PtTt + MN;t
= MN;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)WtNN;t + PtSN;t
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January 2006where Mj;t are end-of-period money holdings and PtSj;t are nominal transfers received from the gov-
ernment due to seigniorage revenues. Because utility is separable in money, the ￿rst-order conditions
outlined in the main body of the paper do not change. However, there are two additional ￿rst-order
conditions governing the choice of money holdings Mj;t. For each agent, h0 (Mj;t=Pt) ￿ UC (Cj;t;Lj;t) +


























UC (CA;t;LA;t). Note that this money demand depends negatively on interest rates.
Importantly, non-asset holders￿money demand does not depend directly on interest rates. Although
￿N
t;t+1 is de￿ned similarly to ￿A
t;t+1, in contrast to the latter it does not constitute a pricing kernel. The
money demand of non-asset holders merely speci￿es the path of money holdings as a function of the










Note that money holdings will increase if present consumption increases and will fall if either future
expected consumption or expected in￿ ation increase. This introduces a channel for non-asset holders to
smooth consumption that is absent in the cashless model.
In order to complete our description of the equilibrium we need to specify four more conditions, since
we have introduced six extra variables: MA;t; MN;t; Mt; SA;t; SN;t; St and two extra equations governing
money demand for each agent. The ￿rst two are straightforward. Money market clearing requires:
Mt = ￿MN;t + (1 ￿ ￿)MA;t, while the de￿nition of total transfers reads as St = ￿SN;t + (1 ￿ ￿)SA;t,
which enters the government budget constraint in a straightforward way.
The last two conditions are slightly more complicated and are related to the government￿ s policy in
redistributing seigniorage revenues to each group in the form of transfers. We choose to specify this policy
in a way that implies the smallest deviation of this model from both (i) a model without money and with
non-asset holders as presented in section 2; and (ii) a model with money in which all agents have access
to complete asset markets. Speci￿cally, we assume that each agent j receives back in transfers precisely
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body holds assets and agents are identical so that the same equality also holds at an aggregate level. In
our framework under this assumption, however, money holdings are di⁄erent across agents, so transfers
across agents will also be di⁄erent. The redistribution scheme in (23) implies that the budget constraint
of the non-asset holders is identical to the one before: PtCN;t+PtTt = (1 ￿ ￿)WtNN;t, whereby consump-
tion tracks disposable income. In fact, all equilibrium conditions of the cashless model are una⁄ected.
The money holdings of asset holders are determined by their money demand equation for a given a path
of consumption, leisure and nominal interest rates, while the money holdings of non-asset holders are
determined endogenously by their money demand equation for a given path of consumption, leisure and
expected in￿ ation.20
Notes
1Changes in the ￿nancial landscape included the phasing-out of ￿ Regulation Q￿ , which had imposed
severe restrictions on the interest paid by commercial banks, a reduced minimum denomination of Trea-
sury bills, the emergence of money market mutual funds, a sharp decrease in trading costs, and a rise
in private shareholding. Generally, the introduction and widespread use of new ￿nancial instruments
and the elimination of ceilings on deposit rates had the e⁄ect of (re-)linking saving decisions to market
interest rates. For a detailed discussion, see Mishkin (1991).
2While these authors are also interested in the response of private consumption to a government
spending shock, their analysis is based on a model featuring strong Edgeworth complementarity between
private and public spending. Relying essentially on preferences to explain the crowding-in of consumption,
this framework strikes us as less suitable for addressing changes in the transmission of ￿scal policy over
time.
3Appendix C shows that the explicit introduction of money into our model would, under reasonable
assumptions, not a⁄ect our theoretical results on the importance of limited asset market participation
for the e⁄ects of a government spending shock.
4This assumption is also made in the ￿ liquidity e⁄ect￿literature - see e.g. Alvarez, Lucas and Weber
(2002). The terminology follows Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). In contrast, Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs
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(2005) and Mankiw (2000) distinguish households by their ability to hold physical capital.5Alternatively, one could assume that consumption shares are equalized by lump-sum redistributive
taxation in steady state, see Gal￿, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2005). However, this would imply that asset
holders pay permanently higher lump-sum taxes.
6Note that, since we assume steady-state debt and de￿cits to be zero, ￿rst-order variations in any of
these variables around the steady state are isomorphic to those of variables de￿ned as shares of steady-
state output. For example, if X = 0, up to ￿rst order around this steady state we have Xt=Yt ’ Xt=Y:
7The resulting model is essentially the same as the lump-sum tax version of Bilbiie and Straub (2004b),
from which the following discussion draws.
8In fact, our estimation exercise will fully address this issue by including the conditional response of
the real wage among the relevant features to match.
9See Blanchard and Perotti (2002), FatÆs and Mihov (2001), Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2005),
and Perotti (2005).
10Lagged debt and output appear as state variables, because the lagged structural de￿cit can be
expressed as a function of these variables by virtue of the government budget constraint.
11The data are drawn from several sources. From the National Income and Product Accounts (Bureau
of Economic Analysis) we obtain real government spending, which is government consumption expen-
ditures and gross investment (A822RX1). Real GDP (A191RX1) and real total personal consumption
expenditures (A002RX1) are also taken from the NIPA. The real wage is obtained from the Bureau of
Labour Statistics: Nonfarm business real hourly compensation (BLS: PRS84006153). Finally, end-of-
period debt ￿gures (total U.S. government debt privately held) come from the International Financial
Statistics of the IMF (11188ZF). Private consumption, output and government spending are normalized
by the current population level (NIPA: B230RC0).
12Alternative identi￿cation schemes applied to the same question have led to mixed results. Using sign
restrictions, Mountford and Uhlig (2004) ￿nd that private consumption increases (falls) after a de￿cit-
￿nanced (balanced-budget) government spending shock, but neither response is signi￿cant. Edelberg,
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) study the response of economic time series to a dummy variable captur-
ing ￿scal episodes (Korean and Vietnam wars and Reagan military buildup) and report mixed results
regarding di⁄erent components of private consumption expenditure at di⁄erent horizons. Overall, the
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reponse of consumption to a ￿scal episode is found to be small in this line of work.13Note that Perotti also calculates the cumulative de￿cit response and ￿nds it positive in both samples,
although much larger in S2 (2.8 vs. 0.8).
14We also considered the possibility of a change in ￿, by imposing 0:77 in S1 and 0:84 in S2, which
corresponds to the values reported by Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) for the periods 1960:1-1979:4 and 1980:1-
1997:4, respectively. Moreover, we also considered the case of ￿ = 0:75 for both samples. Our results
proved to be quite robust with respect to these changes.
15Indeed, our theoretical model can exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy coming from a variety of inter-
acting sources: monetary policy, debt dynamics, the presence of non-asset holders and non-separability
of utility.
16Note however that, while ￿￿ was always estimated to be close to unity for S1, some alternative
speci￿cations that we considered for robustness yielded estimates slightly below unity. Although in this
case the equilibrium is indeterminate under the saddle-path stability criterion, the estimates of the other
parameters and the pattern of the impulse response functions were essentially unaltered. We also did not
observe any material consequences for the counterfactual experiments discussed below.
17Changes in ￿b - estimated to be small throughout - appear to be immaterial in accounting for the
change in transmission and are, therefore, not considered here.
18The obvious exception is the response of government spending, which is only governed by the relevant
persistence parameters and thus una⁄ected by all other parameter changes.
19Alternatively we could have assumed as in Gali et al (2005), that steady-state lump-sum taxes achieve
this equalization; namely, TA
Y = TN
Y + 1￿￿
1￿￿OY . If the pro￿t share OY is non-zero, this would imply that
asset holders pay permanently higher lump-sum taxes. Our assumption implies that the share of pro￿ts
in steady state is zero, in line with the evidence and arguments in Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), and
hence TA
Y = TN
Y = TY .
20The same would hold if the government followed a money supply rule instead of a Taylor rule. For a
given growth rate of total money Mt chosen by the government, the interest rate would be pinned down
by the money demand equation of asset holders.
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aResponses are percent deviations from unshocked path, except for debt,
which is percentage points of output. Standard errors obtained by boot-
strap are reported in parentheses.
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Loss : 20.0897 19.792
bStandard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Transmission in estimated VAR and DSGE model







Legend: impulse responses to one percent increase in real government spending. Shaded areas indicate bootstrapped
90 percent confidence intervals. Vertical axes indicate deviations from unshocked path. Horizontal
axes indicate quarters. DSGE model simulation based on parameter estimates obtained by matching VAR-responses.
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Legend: model impulse responses for S1 and S2 parameter estimates (column a)). Columns b) to f) contrast responses resulting
from S1 baseline estimate with counterfactual responses resulting from varying each parameter of interest from S1 to S2 estimate.
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Legend: model impulse responses for S1 and S2 parameter estimates (column a)). Columns b) to f) contrast responses resulting
from S2 baseline estimate with counterfactual responses resulting from varying each parameter of interest from S2 to S1 estimate.
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